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This thesis investigates the benefits of investing in
graduate education which Acc.rtj.& to both the Navy and the
unrestricted line (URL) ot-ficer, Using historical data,
survivor rates and time in rank between promotions st^s
calculated for three cohort groups (Navy— -funded Master's
degree, non—Navy -funded Master's degree, and non—Master)
Statistical models ^r& introduced to determine whether
di -f -ferences in survivor rates and time in rank &r&
significant among the three comparison groups. The result'
show that di-f ferences in survivor rates and time in rank a?
statistically significant: Navy—funded graduate degree
officers tend to stay in service longer and are promoted
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I - INTRODUCTION
A. OVERVIEW
Studies using a Human Capital approach to investment in
education have indicated that graduate level education is
likely to increase the pecuniary a.nd non—pecun iary returns
for an individual as compared to that same individual's
return i -f he had elected not to acquire additional
education. CRef. 1,2,33. However, a study by Richard
Freeman CRef.43 stipulates an individual could actually
over— invest in education and be worse off in regards to
future earnings as a result of demographics, labor supply in
the major field of education, and individual personal
characteristics.
Historically, the relationship between education and
earnings has been wel 1—documented . Figure 1 below presents
age/earnings profile for males at five levels of schooling:
(1) elementary only, (2) high school graduate, r 3) some
college, (4) college graduate, and ("5) postgraduate
education. It is immediately obvious that differences in
earnings associated with education tend to widen as workers
grow older, In the early years the earnings gap is small.
Workers who have gone to college have not had a chance to
acquire the work experience of their colleagues who have
8
been working rather than attending college. Later, a-fter
they have had a chance to gain experience, their earnings
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Total Money Earnings (mean), All hales, 1981
A more recent study conducted by American Telephone an
Telegraph extending over a 20—year period reveals that
managers possessing a college degree advanced to a higher
management level than those managers with non—col lege
education. CRe-f.63. As shown in Table I, the typical
management level -For college graduates after twenty years
was level three while the modal management level for non
college graduates was two. Only 37 o-f the non—college
sample advanced beyond the third level o-f management
compared to Z1V. o-f college graduates.
TABLE I .












4 o"7 20 4 ._';.
3 64 46 -_> / 29
2 27 20 61 47
1
X 4 3 27 2
1
tal 137 1 007. 129 1 0O7.
Level scale: 1 — initial management entry
6 — vice—presidents of major
corporate -functions
B. PURPOSE
The purpose o-f this thesis is to use a human capital
perspective to determine; (1) i -f the Navy benefits by
funding Unrestricted Line (URL) Officers in graduate
education, and (2) if these URL officers benefit in their
Naval car^er^ as compared to those who either self— fund
graduate education or do not achieve any graduate education
Survivor rates and time in rank between promotions are
thouqht to be two important measures for decidinq whether
10
the Navy and/or the URL officer benefit by investing in
graduate education. Three comparison groups Are defined in
the study: (1) Navy—funded graduate education, (2) non-Navy
funded graduate education, and (3) non-Masters. Differences
in the criteria among the three comparison cohorts are
statistically tested to determine whether the differences
ar^ significant.
The thesis focuses on the unrestricted line corn due to
the recent drop in admissions for pilots at the Naval
Postgraduate School. Favorable economic conditions have
caused a higher separation rate from naval service for this
group, largely due to hiring by commercial airlines. The
Navy believes it will not be feasible to send the pilots to
postgraduate school due to heavy demand in operational
billets. The designators of the unrestricted line officers
selected for this study are listed below in Table II.
C. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
Chapter II deals with the background literature of
Human Capital Theory and its relationship to the Naval
officer as an employee and the Navy as an employer. Chapter
III describes the data file and methodologies used in (1)
constructing cohort files, (2) calculating the survivor
rates and mean time between promotions, and (3) the testing
whether the survivor rates and mean times between promotions
1 1
are significantly different among the following comparison
groups; (a) Navy—funded graduate educated URL officers, (b)
non-Navy funded graduate educated URL officers, and (c) non-
graduate educated URL officers. Chapter IV presents the
results and analysis from statistically testing the
differences in survivor rates and time in rank among the
three comparison groups. Chapter v" states the conclusion
and suggestions/recommendations are made regarding potential




110X General Line Officer
11 IX Line officer qualified in Surface Warfare
112X Line officer qualified in Submarine 'As.r-f-a.re
1 13X Line officer qualified in Special Warfare
114X Line officer qualified in Special Operations
130X Line officer in the aviation community whose
rating as pilot or Naval Flight Officer has been
terminated
131X Line officer qualified for duty involving flying
as a pilot
132X Line officer qualified for duty involving flyinQ
as a Naval Fliqht Officer
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II. LITERATURE REV IEW
A. OVERVIEW
The purpose o-f this chapter is to review and summarize
studies o-f the benefits of graduate education. This chapter
deals with three basic areas: (1) Human Capital Theory.
(2) graduate education decision—viewpoint of URL Navy
officers, and (3) graduate education decision—viewpoint of
the Navy
.
B. HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY
The theory o-f Human Capital suggests that individuals
invest in preparing themselves to be more productive by
achieving additional levels of education if the returns a.rs
greater than their other opportunities for investment. An
example of life cycle investment in education and its effect
on an individual's marginal productivity is shown in Figure
2- An individual begins at T with a marginal productivity
equivalent to M . (Marginal productivity is the
relationship of the increase in one's production given one
additional unit of input.) As that individual undergoes
training (throughout this paper, training is synonymous with
education) at T, for a period of one y&Ar^ his marginal
product value during the education period falls to zero; the










Increasing an Employee's Marginal Productivity
through Education
Upon completion of the education period at T%,
,
the
individual's marginal product rises to M ^ and continues to
grow with the addition o-f on—the— job experience over time,
If this same individual decides to undergo further education
at T H for a period of two units of time, his marginal
product again falls to zero (which had risen to M 4 while on
the job) as the individual attends school. Returning to
work after the two unit education period at T^ results in
the individual producing a higher marginal product value
C!i<,) which increases in future years. This explanation
disregards any decline in marginal productivity with regard
14
to education atrophy caused by an increase in age or changes
in technology which might cause an individual to become
non—product ive.
Upon what rationale does the individual base his
decision whether to invest in education? An individual
decides to invest in education i f the rate o-f return of the
investment is "worthwhile. An example o-f the effect of an
investment in human capital on the earnings o-f an employee
is given in Figure 3 where there a.re two income streams, A
and B- Income stream A represents income o\z<^r time i -f the
individual decides not to acquire additional education while
B is the income stream which commences upon completion o-f a
Bachelor's degree. (Part—time and summer jobs are omitted
in order to keep the methodology simple.)
The income streams a.re highly correlated with the
increase in marginal product shown above in Figure 2. In a
competitive equilibrium wages need not equal the value of
the marginal product CVMP) . All that need hold is that the
present value of an employee's VMP over a period of expected
job tenure 'with the firm equal the present value of the
wages paid. CRef.5, p. 3363.
As shown in Figure 3, the investment in education
consists not only of direct costs—tuition, books, etc. —but
, L 7
also the opportunity costs—the income the individual
foregoes while attending school. The rate of return to the
education investment (r) can be calculated by equating the
Vy
present value o-f annual investment costs (C\) while
attending school to the present value o-f the investment
benefits (B;.) , which a.r& yearly di-fferences between income
stream B and income stream A -Following the attainment o-f the
degree, all brought back to the decision point, in this case
age IS, This rate o-f return can be calculated as -follows:
Solve -for r by. . .
PV C05TSEduc«tion = pv BENEFITSe*^.*,^ (Eq.l)
where. . .
and.
PV BENEFITSEc,_ telc_ , -1^ + jSj^ + ^ + ±L-)T CEq . 3)
(Note: Not all benefits (B;.) will be positive. There
an= years in which income stream A will be greater than
income stream B until point Z is reached.)
This internal rate o-f return is then compared to the
rates o-f return -for other investment alternatives. If the
internal rate of return exceeds the alternative rates o-f
return, the investment will likely be undertaken 1 f the
internal—rate—of—return (r) is more than the market rate of
borrowing funds (i) required to fund the education.
A study by Paul Taubntan estimates rates of return to
schooling beyond high school for those who do not go beyond
high school and those who do. He estimates a rate of return
16
o-f 8.0 percent for those who attend college compared to 3.0
percent -for those who do not attend college, holding genetic
and environmental backgrounds constant via identical twins
as the data set. CRe-f.73, While no single study is
conclusive by itsel-f, Taubman ' s results do suggest that
earning differentials associated with higher levels o-f
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F I GURE 3
.
Basic View o-f Individual whether to
Invest in Education
The individual is not the only one who contemplates
investing in education. An employer may consider investing
in employee human capital, such as on-the-job training and
17
formal education, in hopes that the increase in an
individual's marginal product will in turn increase the
pro-fits o-f the -firm.
The decision o-f an employer to invest in employee human
capital is graphically presented in Figure 4. In this
particular case, the investment occurs only during the -first
unit o-f time in the firm (T,—
T
). An individual's value o-f
marqinal product CVMP, ) is less than the wages paid by
W - W, dollars due to the lack o-f job experience. Since
this is the onlv period where education takes place and the
new value of marginal product (VMR^) now exceeds the wage
rate, an internal rate of return can be calculated by
discounting the sum of the benefits (VMP Z — W ) for the
remaining periods in the firm and equating this to the
dollars spent by the employer. If the rate of return is
greater than alternative rates of return and the market rate
of borrowing the funds, the firm will most likely invest in
employee human capital.
According to Human Capital Theory, educat ion/ t ra i n ing
may be dichotomized into two extreme cases: general
education and specific education. CRef.ll. General
education is education that increases an individual's
marginal productivity to many employers at the same time. A
good example of general education is the investment in
achieving a Master's in Business Administration (MBA). The
courses in the curriculum can be applied to any
18
organization, private or public. An individual who receives
general education will increase his VMP -for all firms
demanding the acquired expertise. There-fore, if the present
employer is not willing to increase an employee's old wage
to his a-f ter—educat ion VMP, the individual receiving the
education is better o-f-f leaving the present employer and
become employed elsewhere. This implies that the costs
related to general education would be borne by the
individual and not the employer. CRef . 5, p . 136 D . As seen in
Figure 5 the education costs (UJ * — W» ) a.rs absorbed by the
individual but upon completion o-f the education period (Tn ) ?
the employee will bene-fit -from the higher wage (w\ ) as he
now has a greater marginal product value (VMP Z ) , £*,r*(>>
Pure specific education is education in which the
employee's value of marginal product is increased for the
current employer but not for other emp lovers. An example is '/=A4
the Navy sending an aviation officer to special weapons 1^., /„.„,£/, ^
training and then to ship—board fire fighting school prior
to reporting to his sea tour obligation. This additional
education increases the officer's value to the Navy, but has
no value for other would—be buyers of aviation expertise.
Not unless United Airlines plans to purchase floating
runways in the Pacific Ocean and invest in ant i—terrorist
weapons would they offer higher wages to a Navy pilot upon







































General Education Pay Structure
10
The cost of investing in speci-fic education is shared by
both the employer and employee. I-f the employer absorbs the
entire speci-fic education costs, then upon completion of the
education period, the employee's wages would never equate to
an amount warranted by general education (since VMP from
general education will be higher than speci-fic VMP in all
-firms). It the individual decides to quit, he would have
the same VMP -for all other employers as when he initially
began work -for the former employer. The employer would be
out of the cost of the education investment without
benefiting from any possible returns. A wise employer will
provide an incentive for the individual to remain after the
specific education period by offering an increase in wage
which is greater that the before—education VMP, but less
than wages offered after general education.
An illustration of the above is observed in Figure 6
where an employee who receives specific education is paid a
higher initial wage (W^) than an employee who receives
general education (W,). Upon completion of the education
period, the employee who received specific training does not
have as high a VMP as the employee who received general
training. The specifically educated employee will receive
less wages for his VMP than the generally educated employee















Speci-fic Education Pay Structure
C. GRADUATE EDUCATION DECISION—VIEWPOINT OF URL OFFICER
Prior to an URL O-f-Ficer deciding whether to invest xn
graduate education, he must undertake a thorough
cost/bene-f i t analysis. Cost/benefit analyses differ
depending on how the officer achieves the graduate
education, either (1) Navy funded, or (2) non—Navy -funded.
1 • Navy—funded
a. Benefits
Within the current inventory of Navy Officers,
percentage of those attaining graduate education increases
with an increase in rank. This suggests that officers with
graduate education tend to stay in the Navy longer ERef.83,
As noted in Chapter I, this is one o-f the areas to be
investigated in this thesis.
A recent study states the chances of promotion
for graduate educated officers a.r& 26 percentage points
higher for 0-3 to 0-4, 11 from 0-4 to 0-5, and 16 from 0-5
to 0—6. CRef.33. (However, there is no distinction in
promotion rates between Navy—funded and non-Navy funded
officers.) Information on FY—37 Line Captain selectees
displayed in Table III below shows that of the URL officers
possessing Master degrees eligible for in— zone promotion,
there was a 55 7. selection rate as compared to a 45 V.
selection rate for those with Bachelor's degrees. Both data
sets contain large numbers to emphasize the statistical
difference. CRef.91.
Benefiting through faster promotion rates by
obtaining a graduate degree helps assure that an officer
will escape the Defense Officer Personnel Act (D0PMA) , which
revises the laws governing military promotion and retirement
practice. CRef.lOH. The D0PMA is an "up or out" policy
which requires officers to leave the service if they Br^ not
promoted to higher ranks within a certain time period. If
an officer fails to screen for promotion to the next highest
rank for two consecutive years, he is subject to an
involuntary release from the military. Once an officer
attains at least IS years length—of—service (LOS), the
Department of Defense (D0D) will allow the officer to remain
on active duty until he achieves the minimum retirement LOS
(20 years) before releasing him from service. The recent
passage of the Gramm—Rudman balanced budget law will -force
the Pentagon to discharge thousands -from active duty ahead
o-f schedule by en-forcing DOPMA. The Air Force alone will
release 5200 airmen who Are not eligible -for re-enlistment
up to -four and one—hal-f months be-fore their normal end of
tour. CRef.113. Though these -figures apply only to the
enlisted ranks, -future implications suggests the officer
corp could be affected.
TABLE III.
FY - 87 URL CAPTAIN PROMOTION STATISTICS
BY SELECTED CATEGORIES
ABOVE ZONE IN ZONE BELOW ZONE
ELIG SEL ELIG SEL '/. SEL
I . Education




b. Bachelors 253 9
i~ B PG ( 1 ess
Masters)
26 11






f. Doctorate 4 3 75.0
Another benefit from selecting Navy-funded
graduate education is the reduction in direct costs, which
consists primarily in the purchasing of textbooks
($l50/qu.arter) . Negligible opportunity costs occur during
the education period as the officer continues to receive hi
24
full military ccmpensation. However, sizable opportunity
costs do arise after, the education period in the -form of
wages -foregone in the civilian sector accrued during the
"payback tour" which is discussed in greater length below.
b. Costs
It was argued in section one o-f this chapter
that general education costs a.re borne by the individual.
Formal graduate education at the Naval Postgraduate School
is just one type o-f general education. At the Naval
Postgraduate School, officers in the ASW curriculum are
attractive resources for the major contractors of the Haivy ' *
submarine fleet (eg. Bath Iron Works and General Dynamics)
as potential Navy liaison personnel.
Within the Navy one of the costs of funded
graduate education takes the form of a payback tour as
dictated by DOD Instruction 1520. B. This directive states
that ". . -officer personnel who have received fully funded
graduate level education will serve: (1) One tour in a
validated position as soon as practicable after completion
of such education, but not later than a second tour.
(2) As many subsequent tours in a validated position as
requirements and proper career development, including
command assignment, will permit. A minimum of two tours is
desirable." CRef.l2D. This implies survivor rates for
Navy—funded graduate education will be 1.0 for a minimum of
25
two tours, or at least -four years since one tour
approximates two years of duty, This will be tested -further
in the thesis.
During the payback tour an o-f-ficer has
opportunity costs in the -form o-f income -forgone in the
civilian sector. The extended obligation also yields
additional costs: (i>. loss of additional income generated by
the spouse because o-f the PCS moves, (ii) higher probability
in divorce rates, and (iii) a higher annualized cost of
leaving CAC0L3 upon completion of the obligated service.
(i) Over the past twenty years, there has
been an increase of women in the labor -force. In 1970,
only 30.5 percent of military wives were in the labor -force,
about 10 percentage points less than for civilian wives. By
1979, both groups showed labor force participation rates of
about 50 percent, a 20 percentage point jump for military
wives. CRef.133. Migration studies show that annual
earnings of civilian spouses can be reduced by $1,000 or
more when a family moves to follow a principal wage earner
to a new job. CRef . 14, p . 21 1 . In 1976 the average earnings
of the military spouses who did not have PCS moves were
$6,000. By comparison, the average earnings of the military
spouse who moved within the continental United States were
$3,000, while those military spouses who moved overseas had
average income of only *2, 125. CRef . 14, p . 223
.
(ii) A recent study in 1981 showed that
even though military and civilian divorce rates a.rs overall
virtually about the same, there were significant statistical
di f ferences in military divorces caused by "military
specific" marital pressures, i.e. PCS moves and temporary
duty (TDY) . Further implication o-F the study revealed that
married life in the military has complications over and
above those in the civilian sector. CRef.l5D,
(iii) The Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL)
model was first proposed by Gotz and McCall. CRef.163. In
this model individuals compare the present value o + the
financial cost of leaving over each possible future ti*r.e
horizon of military service with the present value of their
yearly taste for service factors over the horizon, Over
each possible future horizon, the financial cost of leaving
is the present value of the active duty military pay plus
the increment in the present value of retirement pay minus
the present value of the civilian earnings foregone. The
extended obligation of service of approximately four years
means the Navy—funded graduate officer will be four years
closer to retirement equating a higher present value of
retirement benefits. (Currently, there exists a reported
eight percent earning gap in military earnings as compared
to the civilian sector, As long as an officer's discounted
factor is greater than eight percent, an increase in one's
financial cost of leaving remains valid.)
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Faster promotion rates were earlier stated as a
benefit for the officer, but even promotion has its costs.
When an officer is selected for promotion and accepts there
are minimum years of service within certain ranks in which
an officer must serve prior to separating from service.
Lcdr's (0—4) and below must serve six months in rank prior
to separation while 0—5 ' s and above must serve three years
in rank prior to separation or retirement. CRef.173. There
will be opportunity costs during the obligated time in
ranks.
2 . Non—Navy fun ded
An officer who attends graduate school by virtue of
his own time and expense hopes to realize benefits similar
to a Navy—funded graduate officer's. The opportunity exists
to be promoted faster and farther than if he didn't have the
graduate degree which implies a high probability of escaping
the grasp of the DGPMA Act.
The major difference lies in the area of costs.
There will be a larger outlay of personal income in order to
achieve the graduate degree (tuition and textbooks), but the
absence of a payback tour is a major advantage. The non
Navy funded officer is under no obligation to extend his
commitment to the Navy upon completion of the shore duty
during which he received his graduate degree. This allows
an increase in the spouse contribution to the family income,
a decrease in the annualized cost of leaving, and a decrease
28
in the probability o-f a divorce. I f , however, this o-f-ficer
decides to remain in service, he has several opportunities
to separate -From service within the -four y&ar window his
Navy—funded counterpart must adhere to.
D. GRADUATE EDUCATION DECISION—VIEWPOINT OF THE NAVY
The Navy is unlike its civilian competitive counterpart
when dealing with personnel and wages. The pay structure
under which the Navy operates (increase in pay based on LOS)
implies that officers with the same LOS have equal ability
and productivity regardless o-f the dif-ferent occupation
group they may -fall under, i.e. doctors, engineers,
aviators. Those who agree with this notion argue additional
compensation bonuses (-flight pay) and faster promotion rates
a.re due to hazards and risks involved in the occupation, and
not associated with one's productivity contribution. CRe-f.5,
pp.219—246]. The air^a of compensation wage differential is
guite sensitive: therefore, this paper takes the stand that
pay d i f ferent ials represent both risk and ability. Ability
is stressed when viewing the Navy's decision to invest in
graduate education.
The Navy as an employer must also undertake a




1 , Bene-f its
A study in 1977 by the Center -for Naval Analyses
-focused on the Navy's procurement o-f URL o-f-ficers and its
effects on continuation and retention rates throughout their
naval careers. CRef.171. The results revealed that Naval
Academy graduates had higher survivor rates, continuation
rates, and larger in—zone promotion rates than any other
source o-f commissioning. This knowledge implies that i -f the
Navy invests in graduate education as it does in sponsoring
an undergraduate degree, the same retention bene-f it will
occur.
The Navy views investment in graduate education as a
strategic requi rement necessary for the Navy to keep pace
with changes in management, economic concepts, and
engineering technology which blend together in improving the
strength and readiness o-f the naval communities. There a.r^
countries other than the United States that -feel strongly
about investing in advanced education as a strategic
requirement. The Soviet Union and West Germany have made
significant investments by way of building graduate
institutions and recruiting the top professors in various
fields. Both countries stipulate an officer must acquire
this advanced education if he expects to reach senior
levels. CRef.131. At the Naval Postgraduate School a world
wide representation of international officers can be seen
30
with the majority of these officers coming from Korea,
Greece, and Turkey. This implies that the size of a
country's naval force does not deter the importance of a
graduate officer.
Individuals with Master's degrees a.re rated higher
in administrative skills, intellectual ability, advancement
motivation, work involvement, and general effectiveness when
compared to non—graduate degree holding individuals
according to the 20—year ATS<T study completed in 1984.
CRef
.6, p. 133. These characteristics ^re indeed what the
Navy desires when determining which officer should be
selected to command a squadron, ship, or any shore unit.
2 . Costs
There will not be a guaranteed constant and
positive internal rate of return to the graduate investment.
The DOD directive governing the obligation requirements of
funded graduate level education does not imply the Navy will
achieve the same internal rates of return from all officers
as the payback tour is not dependent upon LOS. An
investment in graduate education by the Navy for an officer
with a LOS greater than 15, who after completing the
education period and the minimum payback obligation is
beyond the minimum retirement LOS, surely is not deemed a
feasible investment. A study by John T. Warner shows that
at LOS 20, yearly continuation rates fall by 62 7. and that
the majority of personnel at this point of service elect to
leave the military service. CRef . 19, Tab le A3D. There-fore,
the Navy must discount the retirement compensation to the
year the officer commences graduate schooling and add this
cost to the direct costs in order to compute total costs for
the investment.
The DOPMA Act has priority over the DOD -Funded
graduate level obligation directive as it is public law. It
would appear that o-f-ficers selected -for -funded graduate
education Are the -front—runners in their respective year
groups and with the addition o-f a Master's degree will not
fail being selected for promotion. There have been
instances, though, in which an NFS graduate has failed to
screen for promotion and was forced to leave the service
before the end of his/her graduate obligation. The Sramm—
Rudman Act enhances the enforcement of the DOPMA Act as
explained in an earlier section. An earlier separation from
naval service prior to the funded graduate level obligation




The data -file relevant to this thesis is entitled
"Officer Master File" (OMF) . It was obtained -from the
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) located in Monterey,
California. The file was originally constructed in 1973 and
now covers calendar period 1973-1935 through annual updates.
The most important limitation of the data file with regard
to this study is the lack of a separation code prior to
1973.
Additionally, the OMF data were compared with student
records from the Registrar's Office at the Naval
Postgraduate School covering the same time period in. order
to validate the yea.r the graduate degree was achieved for
Navy—funded URL officers. This was accomplished by matching
social security numbers from both files and reconciling the
school's graduation date in the officer's record.
The remainder of this chapter covers three areas
associated with the methodologies used in the study. They
a.rB the following: (1) relevant elements of the data base
for the study, (2) construction of the cohort files, and
(3) statistical testing methodologies.
B, RELEVANT ELEMENTS OF THE OMF DATA BASE
The OMF contains a total o-f 210 information elements -for
each officer. Table IV below lists the elements relevant to
this particular study. Following the table is a brief
description of each element and how the element is related
to the study.
TABLE IV.
RELEVANT ELEMENTS FROM MASTER FILE
E1S Designator
E41 Gain/Loss Indicator




E97— 104 Education Information
Yr. , Sponsor, Major
The designator element (E18) lists the current
designator the officer holds. With the focus of the study
on URL, a three digit number represents their respective
designator, i.e. Ill— 111X, 112— 112X, etc. The numeric
code 199 represents "other" URL designators — 113X, 114X,
116X.
A one—character code which indicates the status of an
officer for strength accounting purposes is the gain/loss
indicator (E41). A blank signifies an officer is counted
for active duty while a "L" indicates an officer separated
from the active officer strength for a particular year.




The next element of significance is the separation
designator Department o-f De-fense (DOD) loss code (E76) .
This is a three character alpha/numeric code which
identifies the reason -for an officer' s separation from
active service. Refer to Table V for a brief description of
the relevant loss codes. CRef.203.
TABLE V.
DOD SEPARATION CODE AND REASON
DDD Death while on active duty
FBK Expiration of term of service
JOB Involunteer release
non—select ion for promotion
MBK Completion of required active
service
RBD Volunteer retirement, 20 or
more years active service
SBC Mandatory retirement, attained
max. time in qrade/service
Other elements in the data file originally thought to be
of importance in the study were the Supers loss code and a
separation reason code. A review of these fields found 90
percent of information missing from all loss records.
The promotion history (E83—90) is a six-digit date code
showing dates of rank for each grade an o-fficer has held.
This information is used to compute total months in rank
between promotion. For those officers receiving Master's
degrees (Navy—funded/non—Navy funded), the date of the
degree is entered in a computer program (SAS) which computes
months in rank for each rank after the degree is achieved.
A mean and standard deviation -for each rank in each
comparison group is computed and statistically compared.
The last element discussed is the education level and
sponsor (E97-104) . Since the focus o-f this study is
graduate education, the degree o-f interest is the Master's
degree. The sponsor element shows N -for Navy funding or a
blank for self funded education.
C. CONSTRUCTION OF THE COHORT FILES
As mentioned in a previous section, there a.re three
groups to be studied for comparison: (1) URL Navy-funded
Master's degree recipients, (2) URL non—Navy funded Master's
degree recipients, and (3) URL officers who have not
received a Master's degree. An example of the foundation
for constructing each group is shown in Table VI. This
table lists the number of Master degree holders by Length of
Service (LOS) and Designator (DESIG) for Navy-funded and
non—Navy funded graduate education. The LOS range of
interest is LOS 3 through LOS 15. This range reflects where
a majority of URL officers achieve their graduate education.
All the Navy—funded Master's degree recipients during
years 1973—1980 were combined into one Navy—funded Master's
file. The non-Navy funded Master's degree recipients during
years 1978—1980 were similiarly combined to form one
non—Navy funded Master's degree cohort file. Combining the
1978-1930 files has three positive features: (1) larger
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sample sizes in all cohort -files -for the testing analysis
than found in individual year groups, (2) the years
following the constructed files consist of the obligated
duty for Navy-funded officers (graduate year +1 , +2, +3, +4) in
order to test whether the DOD directive is enforced, and
(3) an additional year beyond the obligated four years is
available to observe if a sudden drop in survivor rates
exists for Navy—funded recipients. One negative feature of
this approach is the inability to observe survivor rates
beyond five years.
The control cohort file for this study is the Navy
funded Master's file. Attempts are made to match as close
as possible numeric values in each individual matrix cell of
this control file when constructing the remaining two cohort
files.
A small problem becomes apparent as one compares the
1973-1930 Navy-funded Master's file to the 1978-1980 non
Navy funded Master's file (Table VI.) The LOS distribution
for the Navy—funded is skewed to the early LOS years as
compared to the smoother LOS distribution in the non—Navy
funded Master's file. Unable to match the non—Navy funded
cohort file with the control cohort file eel 1—for—eel 1
proves to be a minor problem. The properties of the
statistical tests to be applied compensate for the
difference in sample size.
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Construction o-f the non-Master's degree -file proved more
cumbersome. First, several computer runs were used to
verify that o-F-ficers in this group had not received a
Master's degree prior to entering the service, nor had they
received graduate degrees later in their military careers
(beyond LOS 15). Second, the original non-Master -file
consisted o-f over 22,000 records. In order to match the
characteristics o-f. the control cohort -file eel 1— -for—eel 1 , a
random generator process was initiated to select non—Master
records randomly. These records were stored in a temporary
buffer area where they underwent a sequence o-f logic
questions to determine into which cell the records -fell.
Third, commands to count the records -for all cells were
formulated to ensure each cell would meet its required size.
D. STATISTICAL TESTING METHODOLOGIES
Two criteria were used to determine whether
statistically significant differences among the three
comparison groups exist : (1) survivor rates ? and (2) time
in rank between promotions.
1 . T£5 1 ing Surv ivor Rates
A survivor rate in cohort analysis is defined as
follows: Let n be the original number in a cohort, and let
X± (a random variable) be the number that are still in the
system in future period i. Then if G ± = Xi/n, G 4 is called
>8
the survivor rate at ye&r i. The initial survivor rate
(G ) is equal to 1.0 as this is the period where the cohort
-file is constructed.
TABLE VI.
COMPARISON OF NAVY-FUNDED VS. NON-NAVY FUNDED
1978 - 1980 OFFICER TOTALS
Navv Funded
LOS*,DES IG 111
__..!_12 131 132 199 Totals
3 1 I
4 12 1 1 14
5 54 5 5 7 11 82
6 40 9 34 37 "T 123
7 13 3 24 13 -J 65
8 17 3 14 4 6 44
9 21 1 16 1 4 43
10 29 14 5 *"} 50
11 30 1 16 7 5 =;o
12 18 1 9 »-j 1 31
13 2 5 1 1 9
14 2 3
15 -r 1 •«-% 6
Totals 246 25 141 77 43 532
Non—Navy Funded
LOS YDESIG 111 112 131 132 199 Totals
3 •—• 4 1 9 16
4 1 1 3 4 7 21
5 14 2 16 6 10 48
6 28 21 34 9 92
7 11 10 29 28 9 87
8 18 4 20 15 62
9 13 3 26 16 3 66
10 11 1 11 11 7 41
11 10 1 24 7 9 51
12 13 16 5 «> 36
13 12 •j 7 3 1 *?*%
14 10 *-y 10 2 1
15 5 2 4 3 17
Tot als 148 29 194 136 80 5S7
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Next, we de-fine a new variable g x as the probability
an individudal survives i years. The probability of the
random variable X x -follows a binomial distribution with an
expected value equal to n*g ± and an expected variance equal
to n*gi(l-g 1 ). CRe-f .21
,
p. 150D . From this we obtain the
-fol lowing:
Let G t = Xt/n , a. random variable as X* was de-fined as
random variable.
ECGiD = ECXj/nD = 1/n ECX t : = n*g t /n = g x
which is an unbiased estimator, and. . .
(Eg. 4)
VarCGtU = VarCXi/n] = 1/n2 VarCX t D = g t*(l~gi)/n (Eq-5)
Thus, we conclude that G ± is approximately normally
distributed. . .
Gt/%/ N <g x , g i (l-g 1 )/n)
The hypothesis testing for this study is there is no
difference between two population survivor rates in year i
(eg. Gii — Gi.2. = 0) . Hence, the following is observed. .
H ± = G ±x - G 12 (Eq.6)
where.
ECHiD = ECGn - G t2 3 = g ix - g xz (Eq.7)
ana
VarCHi] = g lx (l-g xx )/n + g 12 < l-g X :z> /n (Eg. 8)
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ECzD = and VarCzD = 1, such that z = N(0,1) (Eg. 10)
This allows the use o-f a table o-F normal curve areas
(Z—Table) to determine the value associated with a given
level o-f significance. This value is compared to the test
statistic, such that. . .
Reject the hypothesis i-f Jzl z **/&
where alpha (<*) represents the level o-f significance at
which the hypothesis is being tested, and °* /'2 represents
testing against a two—side alternative. ERef . 21 , p. 3133
.
In this study, both X t and g* Are unknown. X t is
best represented by the actual number who survive in year i.
^
This is annotated by :: *. . The best estimator for g t is g t .
\
where g ± = x 4 /n. Calculating the test statistic is
A.
accomplished by substituting g± for g t and then solving for
z.
2. Testing Time in Rank between.. Promotions
The promotions of interest ^r& 0-3 to 0—4, 0—4 to
0-5, and 0-5 to 0—6 for all comparison groups from 1978
through 1985. For both Master's degree files (Navy-funded
and non—Navy funded) the promotions to the above mentioned
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ranks ar<B observed after the achievement o-f the Master's
degree, The objective is to determine i -f there is a
significant difference in promotion rates with or without
graduate education. Additionally, a test is conducted to
determine whether or not significant differences exist in
promotion times for fully funded versus self funded
educat ion
.
Testing for statistical differences in time in rank
is not as complicated as testing proportions. Each
promotion category (i) has a sample mean Cy ± ) that best
estimates the population mean <u 4 ), ancj a sample standard
deviation (s 4 ) that best represents the population standard
deviation (<7~±) for i = 1,2,"3,. . . . The application of the
Central Limit Theorem states that for any population, the
sampling distribution of the sample sum and of the sample
mean Art^ approximately normal if the sample size n± is




As the sample sizes for the three comparison groups
Ar^ "sufficiently large" and independent, the following




HQ : Li* x " u lz =
H» : i_u i - Uis /
5
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with the Test Statistic. . .
( y ± % - y * 2 )
Z = — (Eq.ll)
(Note: I -f n t and nj both exceed 30, <Tli and &^.-i may
be replaced by Sii 2 and 5i 22 , respectively.)
and the rejection region. . .
Reject H i-f \ 2 j z <*v3
Re-ference is then made to a normal Z—Table where
alpha ("O represents the level o-f significance at which th*
hypothesis is being tested, and <*szz represents testing
against a two—sided alternative.
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I V . RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter presents the results of the statistical
tests applied to the two criteria used in the study
—
survivor rates and time in rank. These results a.r& explored
in order to gain an understanding o-f why d i f -ferences among
the comparison groups exist.
B. RESULTS OF SURVIVOR RATE TESTING
Tests to determine whether statistical d i f -ferences exist
among comparison groups for each year i were made in every
period among all comparison groups. This analysis indicates
that URL officers who receive graduate education stay in the
Navy longer than URL officers who do not receive graduate
education. Additionally, officers who receive Navy—funded
graduate education remain in service longer than officers
who receive self—funded graduate education. Appendix A
summarizes statistical tests for yearly survivor rates
among the comparison groups.
The expected number of years of service obtained from a
member of a comparison group during a given number of years
is approximated by adding the survivor rates (Gj_) of that
cohort file, excluding ysa.r 0, a"vsr that period. Table VII
lists the survivor rates for all three groups. Adding the
survivor rates for Navy-funded graduate recipients indicates
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that these officers contribute approximately 4.74 years in
the 5 year period -following the graduate degree. Of -Fleers
who belong to cohorts non-Navy -funded and non—Masters
contribute 4.42 and 3.44 years respectively.
TABLE VII.
YEARLY SURVIVOR RATES
GROUP YR 1 YR 2 YR 3 YR 4 YR 5 _ TOTAL
NFM .994 .989 .955 . 909 .393 4.74
NONNFM .928 .911 .881 .861 .835 4.42
NONM .776 .714 .682 .647 3.44
NFM = Navy—funded Masters
NONNFM = non-Navy -funded Masters
NONM = non—Masters
Using data -from year 1978 only, survivor rates can be
calculated seven years after graduation. Table VIII lists
the survivor rates -from 1978 data for all comparison groups.
Now observe a Navy—funded graduate officer contributes
approximately 6.44 years out of the seven following
graduation as compared to 5.52 years for non—Navy funded and
4.91 years for non—Masters. If all future survivor rates
could be calculated, the length of service after graduation
could be determined for any group. Unfortunately, reliable
data &rs not available for groups graduating before 1978 so
that complete career patterns cannot be studied. However,
the difference in man—years contribution between Navy—funded
and non—Navy funded/non—Masters appears to grow the further
survivor rates ars calculated. The expected length o-f
service after graduation -for a Navy— -funded o-f-ficer is longer
than the minimum obligation requirement set -forth by the DOD






YEARLY SURVIVOR RATES, 1978 DATA
YR2 .YR3
_
YR4 YR5 YR6 YR7 TOTAL
.983 .963 . 902 .873 .866 ,854 6. 44
.885 . 825 .791 .738 .692 .651 *=; k;*7
.304 .734 .678 .633 .588 .572 4.91
An Area o-f -further analysis is the calculated survivor
rates. Table VII indicates that there exists a large
difference in the -first year survivor rates. This
difference in first year survivor rates is the primary
reason why the remaining yearly survivor rates Are
significant. Observing continuation rates beyond the first
year produces evidence for this statement. A continuation
rate is defined as q:t, /*3ji- This is the probability of an
individual surviving to year i + 1 given this individual
survives to year i. Table IX shows continuation rates f or-
al 1 three comparison groups. Statistical tests reveal no
significant difference among the continuation rates for




GROUP YRl YR2 YR3 YR4 YR5
NFM .994 .995 .966 .952 .982
NONNFM .928 .982 „967 .977 . 970
NONM .776 .920 .956 .950 .962
A major -factor in calculating survivor rates is the
number of yearly separations. Table X below displays a
summary o-f yearly separations -For the three comparison
groups. (Appendix B summarizes separations by designator
and LOS among the comparison groups.)
TABLE X.
YEARLY SEPARATIONS
GROUP N YRl YR2 YR3 YR4 YR5 ...._T_QTA_L
NFM 532 3 3 13 24 9 cr—y
NONNFM 587 42 10 13 12 15 97
NONM 532 119 0<sJ 17 19 13 201
Several observations may be drawn -from Table X. First,
almost all Navy— -funded graduate degree recipients remain in
service within the prescribed minimum obligation of service
dictated by the DOD funded graduate level directive.
Further analysis of these officers reveals that 38 percent
separated from service due to either expiration of term of
service (FBK) or mandatory retirement (RBB) . Those
separating for reason of mandatory retirement show less than
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10 percent -failing to select -for promotion to higher ranks
-For LOS 15 and below. (Appendix C summarizes yearly
separations by designator and separation reason code among
the comparison groups.)
Second, a majority o-f non—Navy -funded graduates separate
within the first two years after graduation. These officers
^rts under no additional obligation to remain in the Navy,
and so can decide to separate or remain in service.
Third, a significant number of non—Masters separate
during year one. These officers ar& also under no
additional obligation to remain in service and decide to
separate.
Further research reveals a commonality in year one's
large separation figures for non-Navy funded and non-Master
URL officers, that being the LOS in which separation occurs.
Calculations show 65 percent (77/119) of the non—Masters
separated after the first term of obligated service
fL0S5/L0S6) with similar results for non—Navy funded
cohorts. In the aviation community, thirty—seven
non—Masters 131 X separated during year one with 65 percent
(24/37) categorized L0S5/L0S6.
C. RESULTS OF TIME IN RANK TESTS
The results show one promotion category where a highly
statistically significant difference in promotion time
exists—LCDR (0-4) to CDR (0-5). In this category, an
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officer bene-f its -from having a Navy— -funded graduate degree
over both the self—-funded graduate officer and the non-
Master officer. The Navy—funded graduate officer is
promoted on average nearly two months sooner than the other
comparison groups. (Appendix D summarizes the results of
the promotion testing results.)
For the promotion category 0—3 to 0—4, there is one
noticeable difference—the number of officers who ^re
promoted. Both the Navy—funded and non-Navy funded graduate
officer totals outnumber the non—Master officer by a ratio
of two to one. The reason was explained in the previous
section. A large number of officers separate in the early
LOS years prior to the LOS where eligibility for promotion
to 0-4 begins.
The results of the statistical tests for promotion
category 0—5 to 0—6 a.r& driven by the small sample sizes for
all comparison groups (n 4 < 7). Statistical testing with
such small sample sizes is not considered reliable.
Nevertheless, the results show a Navy—funded graduate
officer is promoted on average nearly six months sooner than
a non—Master officer, and three months sooner than a self-
funded graduate officer. This implies an officer with Navy-
funded graduate education is promoted faster the farther he
pursues a Navy career than either the non—Navy funded or
non—Master officer.
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Caution should be taken in interpreting these results as
causal. The Navy selects URL officers who a.r& frontrunners
and high achievers in the Navy to receive Navy—funded
graduate education. One o-f the criteria -for selection to
receive Navy—funded graduate education is that the officer
rank in the top 10 percent of his year group. Thus to be
selected to receive Navy—funded graduate education
designates that officer as having been a high achiever in
the Navy and having high potential for success in the
future.
Since the Navy views the Navy—funded graduate officer as
one who has the greatest potential for success in the Navy,
he therefore has the highest expected return -from staying in
the Navy. Hence, we may expect these of-ficers to have
quicker times to promotion and longer length of total
service than their year group peers, independent of the
funding of their graduate education.
JO
V • CONCLUSION
A principal concept of Human Capital Theory helps one
understand whether a URL o-f-ficer and/or the Navy should
invest in graduate education. This concept observes changes
in one's marginal productivity be-fore and a-fter achieving
graduate education in order to calculate a rate o-f return to
the education investment. The rate o-f return from investing
in graduate education is then compared with other investment
opportunities to decide whether the investment in human
capital should be undertaken.
Since we are unable to determine an officer's marginal
productivity before and after graduate education in order to
calculate a rate of return, other criteria a.re chosen for
the study. Survivor rates and time in rank between
promotions are thought to be two important measures for
deciding whether a URL officer and/or the Navy benefit by
investing in graduate education. Three comparison groups
a.rs defined in the study: (1) Navy—funded graduate
education cohorts, (2) non—Navy funded graduate education,
and (3) non—Masters. Differences in the criteria among the
three comparison groups a.r& statistically tested to
determine whether the differences Ars significant. If the
differences are significant, two questions are asked: (1)
Should investment in graduate education be made?, and if so,
(2) How should the investment best be accomplished
—
N&vy
funded or self funded?
The results show that the Navy benefits significantly by
investing in graduate education. An officer who receives
Navy—funded graduate education is estimated to remain in
service significantly longer than either the non-Navy funded
graduate officer or non—Master officer. In the seven years
following graduation a Navy—funded graduate officer
contributes on average 6.44 years compared to 5.52 years and
4.91 years for non—Navy funded and non—Masters officers
respect iv^ly.
The Navy can improve this benefit by monitoring more
closely yearly separations. Results show that some
officers separate from service prior to the completion of
the obligated duty requirement. Separation reason codes
show that over eighty percent of these officers claim
expiration of term of service.
Large numbers of officers belonging to either non-Navy
funded or non—Masters groups separate within two years after
receiving the graduate degree. (In the case of non—Masters,
the separations occur within the first two years.) These
officers e.r& under no additional obligation to remain in
service and decide to separate.
The LOS category where the majority o-F the above
separations occurs in the L0S5/L0S6 range. It is -found that
nearly 65 percent o-F officers separating fall in this
category.
The URL officer benefits from Navy—funded graduate
education. The differences in time in rank a.ra significant
in the 0-4 to 0-5 (LCDR—CDR) promotion category between
Navy—funded vs. non-Navy funded, and Navy-funded vs. non-
Masters. Further results show Navy-funded graduate officers
ar& promoted faster than the other two comparison groups.,
As the Navy—funded officers advance to the rank of 0—6, they
can expect to be promoted, on average, six months sooner
than non—Master officers.
Caution should be taken in interpreting these results as
causal. The Navy selects URL officers who ^ns frontrunners
and high achievers in the Navy to receive Navy—funded
graduate education. One of the criteria for selection to
receive Navy—funded graduate education is that the officer
rank in the top 10 percent of his year group. Thus to be
selected to receive Navy—funded graduate education
designates that officer as having been a high achiever in
the Navy and having high potential for success in the
future.
Since the Navy views the Navy—funded graduate officer as
one who has the greatest potential for success in the Navy,
he therefore has the highest expected return from staying in
the N&vy. Hence, we may expect these officers to have
quicker times to promotion and longer length of total
service than their year group peers, independent o-f the
Funding of their graduate education.
Finally, it is suggested that another data -file be -found
or created so that survivor rates -for more years can be
calculated. This will result in a better approximation o-f
expected length o-f service -for all three comparison groups.
The Navy can then compare the cost o-f the graduate education
investment to the additional years o-f service contributed.
By discounting these -future additional years back to the
yestr the investment occurs, the Navy will be able to
calculate the "real" worth o-f the graduate investment.
Also, it is suggested that one search -for a method that-
best measures an o-f-ficer's marginal productivity be-fore and
after graduate education. The two marginal products cah be
compared to calculate a rate of return. The Navy can then
determine whether graduate education is a feasible
investment compared to other investment opportunities.
APPENDIX A.
SURVIVOR RATE STATISTICAL TEST RESULTS
Su rv i vor Rates
BRQUP N YR1__ YR2 YR3 YR4 YP5
NFM 532 .994 .989 .955 . 909 . 893
NONNFM 587 .928 .911 .881 .861 .835
NONM 532 .776 .714 , 682 .647 . 622
NFM = Navy— -funded
NONNFM = non-Navy -funded
NONM = non-Masters
Year ly Test i ng_
a. Year 1: NFM vs. NONNFM; Z = 5.90-2
NFM vs. NONM; Z = 11.358
NONNFM vs. NONM; Z = 7.242
<* =
.10; Z TABLE value for <*/2 = 1.67
«* = .05: Z TABLE value -for<=»</2 = 1.96
<=*• = .01; Z TABLE value for «»</2 = 2=57;
b. Year 2: NFM vs. NONNFM: Z = 6.19
NFM vs. NONM; Z = 13.68
NONNFM vs. NONM; Z = 8.62
c. Year 3: NFM vs. NONNFM; Z = 4.59
NFM vs. NONM; Z = 12.35
NONNFM vs. NONM; Z = 8.22
d. Year 4: NFM vs. NONNFM; Z = 2,53
MFM vs. NONM; Z = 10.83
NONNFM vs. NONM; Z = 3.50
e, Year 5; NFM vs. NONNFM; Z = 2.35
NFM vs. NONM: Z = 10.87
NONNFM vs. NONM; Z = 8.19
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APPENDIX B.
SUMMARY OF COHORT SEPARATIONS
A. NAVY FUNDED
1. Initial Cohort Matrix
TABLE OF' LOS_GRDY BY DESIGX
LOS_GRDY DESIGX
FREQUENCY | 111 | 112 | 131 | 132 | 199 | TOTAL
+ + + + + +
3
| | 1 | | | | 1
4































































10 | 29 | | 14 | 5 | 2 | 50
+ + + +-- + +
11 | 30 | 1 | 16 | 7 | 5 | 59
+ + + + + +
12 | 18 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 31
+__ + + + + +
13 | 2 | | 5 | 1 | 1 | 9
+ + + + + +
14 | 2 | | 3 | | | 5
+ + + + + +
15 | 3 | | 1 | | 2 | 6
+ + + + + +




Sep a rations by Des i_gnator
a. 111X
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 111
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5|
— _______ _




• • ">«•••• "T — ~ ™ ~ ~ ™ ™' ~"7*
TOTAL
3 | |. | | | |
+ ! + +-- + + +
4 | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 0|
5 | | | 4 | 5 | 1 |
6 | | 1 | 1| 5 1
7 | | | 1 | 2| |
8 | | | | | |
9 | | | 2 | | 1 |
10 | | | | | 1 |
11 | | 1 | | 1 | |
12 | | 1 | | | |
13 | | | | 0) |
15 | | 0] | 1 | |













TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 112
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ + + + + +
3 | | | | | 1 | 1
+ + + + + +
4 | I ' | | | |
— + + + + + 4-
5 | | | | | |
6 | | | | 1 | | 1
7 | | | | | |
8 | | | | | 1 | 1
9 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
10-|
I I I I I






+ + + + + +
12
I I I I I I
+ + + + + +
13
I
| | | |
I
+ + + + + +
15
I
| | | | |
+ + + + + +
TOTAL . . 112 4
c . 1 3 1 X
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 131
LOS.GRDY GRD_LOSS





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 132
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ --+ + + + +
3 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
4 | | ' | | | |
+ +- + + + +
5 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
6







| | | 1
8
| | | | | |
9
| | | | | |
10 |
I I I I I




I I I I I
+ + + + + +
12









| | | |
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| | | | |




TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 199
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS





- ™ ™ ™ ~ ~ ™ ™
~T"~ «»•«• ~T~ — » — « — — ~T" ~ ™ ~ ™ ~ ™ ""T-
3] | | | | |
4 | | | 1 | | |
5 | | | 1 | | |
6 | | | | 1| 0|
7 | | | | 1 |
8 | | | | | |
+ + . +__ + >_+__ +
9 | | | | | |
10 | 1 | | | | |
11 | 0] | | | |
12 | | | | 1 | |
13 | | | | | |











1. Initial Cohort Matrix
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY DESIGX
LOS_GRDY DESIGX
FREQUENCY | 111 | 112 | 131 | 132 | 199 | TOTAL
-+ + + + + +
3 | 2 |. | 4 | 1 | 9 | 16





1 | 8 | 4 | 7 | 21
+ + + + + +
5 | 14 | 2 | 16 | 6 | 10 | 48
+ + + + + +
6 | 28 | | 21 | 34 | 9 | 92
+ + + + + +
7 | 11 | 10 | 29 | 28 | 9 | 87
+ + + + + +
8 | 18 | 4 | 20 | 15 | 5 | 62
+ + + + + +
9
|
13 | 3 | 26 | 16 | 8 | 66
10 | 11 | 1 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 41
+ + + + + +
11 | 10 | 1 | 24 | 7 | 9 | 51
12 | 13 | | 16 | 5 | 2 | 36














15 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 17
TOTAL 148 29 194 136 80 587
63
2 . Sep_a ra.
1
1 ons . b y .Pesiqnatqr
a . 1 1 1
X
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 111
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
3 1 1 | . | | | |
4 | | I • | | |
1
- + + +- + + ---+
5 | 1 | 1 | | | 1 |
6 | 2 | | 2 | | 2 |
3
6
- + - - -+ + + - - -+ +
7 | 1 | | | | |
8
I
2 | 2 | 1| | |
9 | 2 | | | | |
10 | 1 | 1 | | | |
11 | 1 | | 1 | | |
12 | | | | | |
13 | | | 1 | 1 | |
14 | | | | | 2 |
15 | | | | | 1 |












TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 112
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCYI 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ + + + + +
3 | | | | | |
-- + + + + + +
4 | | | | | |
«--——-+—- +-- + + + +
5 | | | | | |
+ + + + + --+
6
| | | | | |
7
|
1 | | 1| | | 2
8
| | | | | |
9 | 1 | | | 1 | | 2
10 | 1 | | | | | 1
11 | | | | | |
12 | | | | | |
13 | | | | | |
--+ _-+-_ + + + +
14 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
15 | j I I I 1 I 1




TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 131
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
3 | | | 1 | | | 1
+ + + + + +
4 | | 1 | | 1 | | 2
+ + -+ + + -+
5 | 3 | | 1 | | 1 | 5
6 | 2 | | | | | 2
7 | 1 | | 1 | | | 2
8 | 2 | | 1 | 1 | | 4
9 | 1 | | | | | 1
10 | I I l 1 I I 1
11
I I I I I I
12
I I I I I I
13
I
1 | | | | | 1
14
I
1 | 1 | | | 3 | 5
15 | 0! | | | |
TOTAL 11 2 4 3 4 24
66
d. 132X
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 132
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ + + + + +
3 | | | | | |
+ + +_ _ + + +
4 | | | | | |




1 | | 1
6
| 3| | 1| 1| | 5
7
|










1 | | | 3
10 | | | | | |
+ + + + + --+
11 | |
I I I I
+ + + + + --+
12
I
| | | | |




| | 1 | | 1 | 2
+ +-- + + + +
14 | | | | | 1 | 1
+ + + + + +
15 | | | 1 | | 1 | 2
+ + + + + -+
TOTAL 8 2 4 4 3 21
67
199'
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 199
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5|
3 | | | | | |
4 | 1 | 1 | | |
5 | 2 | | | 1 | |
6 1 11 0| | 1 | 0|
7 | 1 | 1 | 1| | |







.__ ,__+ + + + + +
9 | 1 | | 3 | | |
10 | 1 | | | | |
11 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
12 | 1 | | | | |
13 | | | | | |
14 | | | | | |
15 | | 1) | 1 | 1 |








1 . I n
i
tial .Cohort liatr ix.
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY DESIGX
LOS_GRDY DESIGX
FREQUENCY | 111 | 112 | 131 | 132 | 199 | TOTAL
+ + + + + +
3 | | 1 | | | | 1
+ -+ + + + --+
4 | 12 | 1 | | | 1 | 14
. + + + + + +
5
|
54 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 11 | 82
6
|
40 | 9 | 34 | 37 | 3 | 123
7 | 18 | 3 | 24 | 13 | 7 | 65
+ + + + + +
8
|
17 | 3 | 14 | 4 | 6 | 44
9
|
21 | 1 | 16 | 1 | 4 | 43
10 | 29 | | 14 | 5 | 2 | 50
11 | 30 | 1 | 16 | 7 | 5 | 59
12 | 18 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 31
+ + + + +- +
13 | 2 | | 5 | 1 | 1 | 9
+ + + + + +
14 | 2 | | 3 | | | 5
+ + +-- + + +
15 | 3 | | 1 | | 2 | 6
+ + +- + + +
TOTAL 246 25 141 77 43 532
2 . Sep arat ions by Des i an ator
a . 1 1 1 X
TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS_SEPY
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 111
L0S_YRS LOS_SEPY
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5|
4 | 7 | 1 | | 1 |
TOTAL
8
+ + --+-- + + +
5
I
20 | 5 | 1 | 2| 1 |
6] 11 | 3 1 1 | 1 | 1 |
7 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | 2 |
8 | 4 | | 1 | 1 | |
9 | 3 | | 2 | 1 | |
10 | 4 | 3 | 1 2| |
11 | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 2 |
12 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 1 |
13 | | | | | |
14 | | | | | |
15 | | | | 1 | 1 |













TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS_SEPY




1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ + + + + +
4| | | | | |
+ + + + + +
5| 2 | | | | | 2
+ + + + +_ +
6 | 1 | 0| 1 | 0| 1 | 3
._ + __+ + + + +
7
| Of 1 | | 1 I I 2
8
| |
1 | 1 | | | 2




I I I I




I I I I I
12
I I I I I I





+ + + + + +
14
I
| | | | |
+ + + + + +
15
I
| | | | |
+ + +- --+ + +
TOTAL 3 3 2 1 1 10
71
131 X
TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS_SEPY
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 131
LOS_YRS LOS_SEPY
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
™ — — — ~ — "*™ ™
i ™
—
~ "" ™ "" ™ " i "" — " " — m ~ ~ v • •» — • — — « ™ "t" ~ ™ — " ~ — ™ ~"T" — ™ — " ™ ~T
4| | | | | |
5 | 3j 1 | | | |
6[ 21 | 2 | | | |
7 | 4| 3| 1 | 1| 0|
8 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | |
9 | 3 | 1 | | 1 |
10 | 1 | | | | |




1 il o | | 1 |
12 | | | | | |
13 | 1 | | | | |
14 | 1 | | | | |
15 | | | 1 | | |














TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS_SEPY
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 132
LOS_YRS LOS_SEPY
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ + + + + +
4 | | | | | |
+
.-+ + + + +
5| 1 | | 1 | | | 2
+-- +--'- + + + +
6 | 11 | 3 | 1 | | 1 | 16
+ + + + + +
7 | 1 | 1| 0| 1 | 1 | 4
+ +-- + + + +
8
| | | 1 | | | 1
9 | | | | | |
10 | 2
I | | | | 2
11 | 1 | | | 1 | | 2
12 | | | | | 1 | 1
13 | | | | | |
14 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
15 | | | | | |
TOTAL 16 4 3 2 3 28
73
199X
TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS_SEPY
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 199
LOSJTRS LOS_SEPY
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
-- + + +-- + + +
4 | | | 1 | | |
5 | 6 | 1 | | 2 | |
6 | 1 | | | | |
7 | 1 | 1 | | 1| |
, + + + + ...+ , +
8 | 1 | | | 1 | |
9 | | 1 | | | |
10 | o | - | | | |
11 | | | | | |
12 | | | | | |
13 | | | | | |
, + + + + +-.. +
14 | | | | | |
15 | | | | 1 | |











SUMMARY OF FBK AND RED
SEPARATION REASON CODES
FBK
1 . Navy— -funded
a . 1 1 1 X
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 111 SPD=FBK
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY! 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ + + + +- +
3 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
4 | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | 3
+ + + + +- +
5 | | | 4 | 4 | 1 | 9
+ + + + + +
6 | | 1 | | 4 | | 5
+ + + + + +
7 | | | 1 | 1 | | 2
8 | | | | | |
9 | | | 1 | | | 1
10 | | | | | |
11 | | | | | |
+- + + +- + +
12 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
13 | | | | | |
-+ + + + +-- +
15 | | | | | |
+- -4- + + + +
TOTAL 1 1 7 10 1 20
7!
b. 112X
TABLE OF LOS.GRDY BY GRD_LOSS




1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
3 | | | | | |
4
| | . | | | |
5
| | | | | |
6
| | | | | |
7
| |
| | | |
8




9 | | | | | |
10




I I I I I I
12







| | | | |
TOTAL .... 1 1
76
c. 131X
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 131 SPD=FBK
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY! 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ + + + + +
3 | | | | | |
+ + + + + _ _+
4 | | | | | |
-_._. +_.,_--__,_+_.,__„ + + + +
5 | | | | | |
_ +=__
















| | | | | |
9














+ + + + + +
12
I I I I I I





+ + + + + +
15
I
| | | | |




TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS






































































-+ , +- ,---+-_.
I I I I

















TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 199 SPD=FBK
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1 | 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ + + + + +
3 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
4 | | | 1 | | | 1
- + +- + + + +
5 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
6 | | | | 1 | | 1
7 | | | | | |
8 | | | | | |
9 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
10 | 1
I I I I I
1







+ + + + 4- +
12
I
| | | | |
+ + +- + + +
13 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
15 | | | | | |
+ + + + +- +
TOTAL 1.11.3
79
2 . Norv—Nlavy -funded
a . 1 1 1 X
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 111 SPD=FBK
LOS.GRDY GRD.LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
3 | | . | | | |
--+ +-- + + + +
4 | | | | | |
5 | 1 | 1 | | | 1
6 | 2 | | 1) | |
7 | 1] | | | |
8 | 11 | | | |
9 | If | | | |







+ + + + + +
11 | | | | | |
12 | | | | | 0(
13 | | | | | |
14 | | | | | |
15 | | | | | |
TOTAL 7 2 1.. 10
80
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 112 SPD=FBK
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ + + + + +
3 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
4 | | . | | | |
—+— + + + + +
5 | | | | | |
6 | | | | | |
7 | 1 | | 1 | | | 2
8 | | | | | |
- -+ + + + + +
9 | | | | | |
10 | | | | | |
11
I I I I I I





+ + + + + +
13
I
| | | | |
+_ + + + + .+
14
I
| | | | |
+ + +_ _+ + +
15 | | | | | |
+ + + + --+ +
TOTAL 1 . 1 . . 2
81
131 X
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 131 SPD=FBK
LOS_GRDY GRD.LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5|
4. + + +_ + +
3 | | | I) | |
+ + .+ + + +
4 | | 1 | | 1 | |
5 | 1 | | | | |
6 | 1 | | | | |
7 | 1 | | | 0| |
8 | 2 | | | | |
9 | 1 | | | | |
10 | | | | 0( |
11 | | | | | |
12 | | | | | |
13 | 1 | | | | |
14 1 | 1 | | 0[ |
15 | | | | | |














TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 132 SPD=FBK
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ + + + + +
3 | | | | | |
+ + + + . 4- +
4




| | | |
6
| 2 | | | 1 | | 3
7
|
3 | 1 | | | | 4
8
| | | | | |
9
|




l I I I










+ + + + + +
12
I I I I I I




I I I I
— -+ +-- -+ + 4- +
14
I
| | | | |
+ + + + + +
15
I
| | | | |





































TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS









| | | 1
6
|
1 | | | 1 | | 2
7
| |
1 | 1 | | | 2
8
|
1 | | | | 1
6














































































TOTAL 3 1 1 1
84
3 . Non—Masters
a . 1 1 1
X
TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS_SEPY
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 111 SPD=FBK
LOS_YRS LOS_SEPY
FREQUENCYI 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+_ + + + + _ __+
4| 5 | 1 | | | | 6
+ +__ + + + +
5 | 18 | 5 | 1 | | | 24
+ + + + + +
6 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 1 | | 14
7 | 1 | 1 | | | | 2
+ + + + + +
8| 4 | | | | | 4
+ + + + +-- +
9 | 2 | | | | | 2
10 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | | 4
11 | | | | | |
12 | 1 | | | | | 1
13 | | | | | |
14 | | | | | |
--+- --+ + + +-- +
15 | | | | | |
+ + + + 4- +
TOTAL 41 12 3 1 .57
b. 112X
TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS_SEPY
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 112 SPD=FBK
LOS_YRS LOS_SEPY
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
4 | | | | | |
5 | 1|. | | | | 1
6 | 1 | | | | | 1
7 | | | | 1 | | 1
8 | | 1 | | | | 1
9 | | | | | |
10 | | | | | |
11 | | o I I o I o I
12
I
| | | | |
+ , + —+ + + +
13
I
| | | | |
14 | | | | | |
15 | | | | | |
TOTAL 2 1.1.4
wo
c . 1 3 1 X
TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS_SEPY
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 131 SPD=FBK
LOS_YRS LOS_SEPY
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
4 | | | | | |
5| 3| 1 | 0| | | 4
+ -|- + +__ +__ +
6 | 13 | 1 | | | | 14
7 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0| | 7
8 | 2 | | | | | 2
9 | 3 | | | | | 3
+ + + + + +
10 | | I I I I














I I I I
+ + + + + +
13
I
| | | | |
+ +- + + + +
14
I
| | | | |
+ + + + + +
15 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
TOTAL 26 4 1 .31
87
d. 132X
TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS.SEPY
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 132 SPD=FBK
LOS_YRS LOS_SEPY
FREQUENCY) 1| 2| 3| 4) 5) TOTAL
4| | | | | |
5 | 1 | | 1 | | |
6| 9| 2 | | 0| |
7 | | | | | |
8 1 | | 1 | | |
9| | | | | |
10 | | | | | |
11 | 1 | | | 1 |
12 |* | | | | |
13 | 0"| | | | |
14 | | 0[ | | |
15 | 0) | | | |








TABLE OF LDS.YRS BY LOS_SEPY
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 199 SPD=FBK
LOS_YRS LOS_SEPY
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ + + + + +
4 | | | 1 | | | 1
5 | 2 | 1 | | | | 3
6 | 1 | | | | | 1
+ + + -+ + +-
7 | 1 | 1 | | | | 2
6 | 1 | | | | | 1




I I I I





+ + + + +-- +
12
I I I I I I







+ + + + + +
14
I
| | | | |
+ + + + + +
15
I
| | | | |
+ + + + + +
TOTAL 5 2 1 . . 8
89
RBD
1 . Navy— -funded
a . 1 i i X
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS




1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
3
|
| | | | |
4
|





| | | |
1 | 1 | 2
7 | 0| | 0| 1 | | 1
8
| | | | | |
9
| | |




















| | | | |
15 | | | | 1 | | 1
TOTAL . 114 3 9
90
b. 112X
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 112 SPD=RBD
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
3 | | | | | 1 | 1
4 | | | | | |
5 | | | | | |
6 | | | | 1 | | 1
7 | | | | | |
8 | | | | | |
9 | | | | | |














| | | | |
+ + + + + +
13 | | | | | |
+ +- + + + +
15 | | | | | |
+ --+ + + + +
TOTAL . . 1113
31X
TABLE OF LOS.GRDY BY GRD.LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 131 SPD=RBD
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ +__ 4. + + +
3 | | | | | |
4 | |- | | | |
5 | | | | | |
+ + + + + 4.
6 | | | | | |
+ + -+ + + +
7 | | | | | |
8 | | | 1 | | | 1
4. +__ + 4. 4. 4-
9 | | | | | |
,_+ 4. + + + 4.
10 | | | I I I
11





I I I I I I
13









TOTAL . . 12 14
92
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 132 SPD=RBD











































































| | | | |

























I I I I I


















TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 199 SPD=RBD
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
+ + + + + +
3 | | | | | |
-- + + + + -+ +
4 | |. | | | |
,__+ + + +- --+ +
5 | | | | | |
---
-+ + + +- + +
6 | | | | | |
--- +-- +--- +-- + + +
7 | | | | | |
.._.-----+_-.-.,_-+ _ + + + +
8 | | | | | |
...__+ + + ---+ + -+
9 | | | | | |
10 | | | | | o | •
_-_.-..__+ + + + +- +
11 | | I I I I
---_---,--+ + -+ + .+-- --.__--+
12
I
| | | 1 | | 1
--+— + + + + +
13
I
| | | | |
15 | | | | | |






a . 1 1 1 X
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 111 SPD=RBD
L0S_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCYI 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
3 | | | | | |
4 | Of | | | |
5 | | | | | 1 | 1
6 | | | | | 2 | 2
7 | | | | | |
8 | | 2 | 1 | | | 3
9 | 1 | | | | | 1
10 | | | | | |
11 | 1 | | | | | 1
12 | | | | | |
+_ __-(. + + + —
+
13 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
14 | | | | | 1 | 1
+ --+ +- + + +
15 | | | | | |
.—+ +_ + + + +
TOTAL 2 2 1. 4 9
ta. 112X
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS

































4 | 5 | TOTAL
| | | | |
0-
| | | | |
+ + + + +
|
I I I I
I I I I I
I I I I I
• + + + + +

















I I I I I
I I I I I









1 3 1 X
TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 131 SPD=RBD
LOS_GRDY GRD_LOSS
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5|
3 | | | OJ | |
4 | OJ | | | |
5 | | | | | |
6 | | | | | |
7 | | | | | |
8 | | | | | |
+ + + + + +
9 | | | | | |
10 | 01 • | | 1 | |
11 | | | | | |
12 | | 01 0] | |
13 | | | 01 | |
14 | 1 | | | | 3 |
15 | | | | | |







TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS
















































































l I I I
o
























TABLE OF LOS_GRDY BY GRD_LOSS



























1| 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | TOTAL
+- + + -+ +
| | |
I I




















+ + +— + +
I I I I I



































+ --+ + + +
I
1
I I I l
1
1 2 . . 3
QO
3 . Non—Mas ter
s
a , 1 1 1
X
TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS_SEPY
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 111 SPD=RBD
LOS.YRS L0S_SEPY
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| TOTAL
-- + + + +- -+ +
4| |. | | | |
5 | 1 | | | | 1 |
6 | | | | | |
7 | | | | | 2 |
8 | | | | 1 | |
9 | | | 2| 1 | |
10 | | 1 | | 1 | |
11 | | | | 1 |
.
1 |
12 | | 1 | | 1 | |
13 | | | | | |
14 | | | | | |
15 | | | | | 1 |












TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS_SEPY
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 112 SPD=RBD
LOS_YRS LOS_SEPY






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS.SEPY
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 131 SPD=RBD
LOS_YRS LOS_SEPY
FREQUENCYI 1| 2| 3| 4| 5|
,__.__+ + +_ +__- + +
4| | | | | |
5 | 0-| | | | |
6 | | | | | |
_ + +. + +_. + +
7 | | | | 1 | |
8 | | 1 | | | |
9 | | 1| | | |
10 | 1 1 1 1 1
11 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
12 1 | 1 1 1 1
13 1 | | | | |
14 | 1 | | | | |












TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS_SEPY
CONTROLLING FOR DESIGX= 132 SPD=RBD
LOS_YRS LOS_SEPY
FREQUENCY | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5|
4| | 0] | | |
5 | | | | | |
6 | | 1 | | 1 |
7 | | | | 1 | |
8 | | | | | |
9 | | | | | |
10 | 1 | | | | |
11 | | | | 1 | 0]
12 | | | | | 1 |
13 | | | | | |
+-- + + 4- + +
14 | | | | 01 |
15 | | | | | |










TABLE OF LOS_YRS BY LOS_SEPY























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IME IN RANK STATISTICAL TEST RESULTS
1. LT - LCDR:




NFM 331 61.21 12.31
NONNFM 293 62 . 02 7=08 50,11
NONM 155 61.62 3. 98 15,82
* months NFM = Navy—funded
NONNFM = non-Navy -funded
NONM = non-Master
a. NFM vs. NONNFM; Z = -1.78
b. NFM vs. NONM: Z = -1.10
C. NONNFM vs. NONM; Z = 0.77
**=
.10; Z TABLE value for <*/2 = 1.67
"*=
.05; Z TABLE value for <*/2 = 1.96
°L = .01: Z TABLE value for «V2 = 2.57 1
LCDR- CDR:




NFM 198 67.95 20. 89
NONNFM 185 69.59 7 . 08 50 . 1 1
NONM 149 69.93 6. 17 38.07
a. NFM vs. NONNFM: Z = -2.67
b. NFM vs. NONM: Z = -3.30
c. NONNFM vs. NONM; Z = -0.47
1 01
3. CDR - CAPT:
GROUP N MEAN* SIB- ^
NFM 72.01 5 . 0=
NONNFM 7 75 . 1 5.8:





1 V . u
.
a. NFM vs. NONNFM:
b. NFM vs. NONM; Z = -1.97




.00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09
0.0 .0000 .0040 .0080 .0120 .0160 .0199 .0239 .0279 .0319 .0359
0.1 .0398 .0438 .0478 .0517 .0557 .0596 .0636 .0675 .0714 .0753
0.2 .0793 .0832 .0871 .0910 .0948 .0987 .1026 .1064 .1103 .1141
0.3 .1179 .1217 .1255 .1293 .1331 .1368 .1406 .1443 .1480 .1517
0.4 .1554 .1591 .1628 .1664 .1700 .1736 .1772 .1808 .1844 .1879
0.5 .1915 .1950 .1985 .2019 .2054 .2088 .2123 .2157 .2190 .2224
0.6 .2257 .2291 .2324 .2357 .2389 .2422 .2454 .2486
.
.2517 .2549
0.7 .2580 .2611 .2642 .2673 .2704 .2734 .2764 .2794 .2823 .2852
0.8 .2881 .2910 .2939 .2967 .2995 .3023 .3051 .3078 .3106 .3133
0.9 .3159 .3186 .3212 .3238 .3264 .3289 .3315 .3340 .3365 .3389
1.0 .3413 .3438 .3461 .3485 .3508 .3531 .3554 .3577 .3599 .3621
1.1 .3643 .3665 .3686 .3708 .3729 .3749 .3770 .3790 .3810 .3830
1.2 .3849 .3869 .3888 .3907 .3925 .3944 .3962 .3980 .3997 .4015'
1.3 .4032 .4049 .4066 .4082 .4099 .4115 .4131 .4147 .4162 .4177
1.4 .4192 .4207 .4222 .4236 .4251 .4265 .4279 .4292 .4306 .4319
1.5 .4332 .4345 .4357 .4370 .4382 .4394 .4406 .4418 .4429 .4441
1.6 .4452 .4463 .4474 .4484 .4495 .4505 .4515 .4525 .4535 .4545
1.7 .4554 .4564 .4573 .4582 .4591 .4599 .4608 .4616 .4625 .4633
1.8 .4641 .4649 .4656 .4664 .4671 .4678 .4686 .4693 .4699 .4706
1.9 .4713 .4719 .4726 .4732 .4738 .4744 .4750 .4756 .4761 .4767
2.0 .4772 .4778 .4783 .4788 .4793 .4798 .4803 .4808 .4812 .4817
2.1 .4821 .4826 .4830 .4834 .4838 .4842 .4846 .4850 .4854 .4857
2.2 .4861 .4864 .4868 .4871 .4875 .4878 .4881 .4884 .4887 .4890
2.3 .4893 .4896 .4898 .4901 .4904 .4906 .4909 .4911 .4913 .4916
2.4 .4918 .4920 .4922 .4925 .4927 .4929 .4931 .4932 .4934 .4936
2.5 .4938 .4940 .4941 .4943 .4945 .4946 .4948 .4949 .4951 .4952
2.6 .4953 .4955 .4956 .4957 .4959 .4960 ' .4961 .4962 .4963 .4964
2.7 .4965 .4966 .4967 .4968 .4969 .4970 .4971 .4972 .4973 .4974
2.8 .4974 .4975 .4976 .4977 .4977 .4978 .4979 .4979 .4980 .4981
2.9 .4981 .4982 .4982 .4983 .4984 .4984 .4985 .4985 .4986 .4986
3.0 .4987 .4987 .4987 .4988 .4988 .4989 .4989 .4989 .4990 .4990
Note: Z —Table above yields only 507. ai- total probability -fo
normal curve areas.
Step 1. Select level of significant; («<=. 10 and «*/2 = .05)
Step 2. Subtract: .5 - °V2 "; (.5 - .05 = .450)
Step 3. Find above numeric value in body of table
Step 4. Z—Table value: Farthest left column plus top row
number associated with Step 3 value: (1.645)
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